





















































The Institute of Social Studies is Europe’s longest-established centre of higher education and 
research in development studies. On 1 July 2009, it became a University Institute of the Erasmus 
University Rotterdam (EUR). Post-graduate teaching programmes range from six-week diploma 
courses to the PhD programme. Research at ISS is fundamental in the sense of laying a scientific 
basis for the formulation of appropriate development policies. The academic work of ISS is 
disseminated in the form of books, journal articles, teaching texts, monographs and working 
papers. The Working Paper series provides a forum for work in progress which seeks to elicit 
comments and generate discussion. The series includes academic research by staff, PhD 
participants and visiting fellows, and award-winning research papers by graduate students. 
Working Papers are available in electronic format at www.iss.nl 
 
Please address comments and/or queries for information to: 
Institute of Social Studies 
P.O. Box 29776 
2502 LT The Hague 




Table of Contents 
ABSTRACT  4 
1 THE (ABSENCE OF) ETHICS OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND 
THE NEED FOR A LANGUAGE ABOUT BEING HUMAN 5 
2   THE INSUFFICIENCY OF CONVENTIONAL ECONOMIC LANGUAGES 7 
3   HUMAN SECURITY THINKING 17 
4  A LANGUAGE FOR TRANSITION? 21 




The language of ‘human security’ arose in the 1990s, including from UN work 
on ‘human development’. What contributions can it make, if any, to the 
understanding and especially the valuation of and response to the impacts of 
climate change? How does it compare and relate to other languages used in 
describing the emergent crises and in seeking to guide response, including 
languages of ‘externalities’, public goods and incentives, cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness analysis? The paper examines in particular the formulations in 
those terms in Stiglitz’s Making Globalization Work and Stern’s The Economics of 
Climate Change and Blueprint for a Safer Planet, and how they are left groping for 
frameworks to motivate the changes required for global sustainability. It 
undertakes comparison also with the languages of human development and 
human rights, and suggests that, not least through enriching our skills of 
‘narrative imagination’, the human security framework supports a series of 
essential changes in orientation—in our conceptions of selfhood, well-being 
and situatedness in Nature—and contributes towards a required greater 
solidarity and greater awareness of our inter-connectedness. 
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Climate change and the language of human security1 
1 The (absence of) ethics of  global environmental change 
and the need for a language about being human 
A great deal is known now about current global climate change:- the serious 
risks of moving irreversibly outside the climate-bands to which human 
societies across the world have become adapted over very long periods; the 
likely largely irreversible effects from build up of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere, and the danger of triggering large-scale melting of the polar ice 
caps; the now commencing and unavoidable phase of ‘early harvest’ costs that 
will hit poorest groups and poorest countries the most; and the substantial 
possibilities of subsequent phases of major deterioration and even catastrophe 
(IPCC, 2007; Stern, 2007; UNDP, 2008; World Bank, 2009). 
Much has been written also about the ethics of global environmental 
change. The 2007-8 Human Development Report provides a forthright 
introduction to the absence of ethics in current policy and practice (e.g.: 
section 1.6, pp. 166-171, 185 ff.). To use Biblical language, the sins of the 
fathers will be visited on other men’s sons, in a ‘Slaughter of the Innocents’; 
and from those who have little shall be taken what little they have. From those 
that already have, do not (if judging from past behaviour rather than past 
language) expect much; not even sympathy or attention can be presumed 
(UNDP 2008: 66). Rich countries that invest massively in their own security 
have often claimed, for example, that there is too much uncertainty to invest 
on a large scale in climate change ‘mitigation’ and global climate security. 
However, from those from whom much will be taken may well eventually 
come back more than is presently foreseen by business and political leaders in 
rich countries—in the form of violent conflict, migration, disease, trafficking 
of persons and drugs, piracy, and other such forms of ‘adaptation’. 
For scientific knowledge and ethical argumentation to have influence 
requires more than merely publication. It requires a context of frameworks of 
thought that stimulate and channel attention, interest and passionate energies, 
amongst leaders, opinion formers and wider publics. Otherwise, materials that 
are too uncomfortable soon get overlaid by other concerns, as we have seen 
throughout the past two generations. 
Predominant contemporary frameworks of thought are economic, 
reflecting the predominance of global capitalism. Much modern political, 
academic and journalistic discourse privileges ‘the economy’, which is taken as 
central; this is the perspective of businessmen. We hear of ‘the world economy’ 
rather than ‘the world’, of ‘the Western economies’, ‘the emerging economies’, 
and so on. Left in second and third place are ‘society’ and ‘environment’. 
‘Environment’ is the unconsidered mess- and shock-absorber where one 
                                                 
1 Presented at the conference on ‘Integrating Development Ethics and Climate 
Change Ethics’. Rock Ethics Institute, Pennsylvania State University, April 14-16, 
2010. I would like to thank Donald Brown and Nancy Tuana, the conference 
organisers. An early version of ideas in parts of the paper is found in Gasper 2009. 
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dumps wastes; it serves as ‘sink’ and recycler, we hope. ‘Society’, a residual 
category that includes the realms of social life not covered by the money 
economy, likewise provides implicitly various ‘sink’ and recycling services, we 
hope. It is, like ‘environment’, treated as an accommodating mother-equivalent 
that absorbs ‘external effects’ and provides succour and refreshment for ‘the 
economy’, that autistic child driven by inner compulsions. Most aspects of 
reproduction—biological, environmental, emotional, psychological, cultural, 
familial, organizational, political—are underweighted or ignored by a 
conventional economics obsessed with production, or to be precise with 
monetized production. Oblivious to broader reproduction, economics not 
merely pushes many things to the margin of calculated profitability, it pushes 
other things beyond the margin of attention and thus into and beyond the 
margins of risk. 
Beyond the phase of autism and the assumption that mother, including 
Mother Earth, will tidy up after us, comes a second phase, of attempts to use 
market-derived economics reasoning to assess the ethical and policy 
implications of environmental change. As seen even in the 2007 Stern Review, 
these attempts misrepresent and vitiate some of the important implications. 
The economics language of ‘public goods’, ‘public bads’ and ‘market failures’ is 
relatively comfortable and familiar, and very useful in understanding many 
aspects of climate change and global insecurity (e.g., Kaul et al., 1999), but is 
too impersonal to motivate basic rethinking and political reorientation. It 
contains little discussion of the human meaning of these ‘failures’, including 
the likely resulting anger, conflict and desperation that will bring further layers 
of costs. Correspondingly, together with its bias to measurement in terms of 
ability to pay, it tends to generate overoptimistic projections and unbalanced 
evaluations. 
In a third phase, more strongly exemplified in Stern’s recent work (2010), 
economic analysis can be redirected and kept in perspective: its role is to help 
in identifying ways for preserving the environment efficiently, not for trading-
off environmental values against (other) monetized values. At points in his 
disquisition on preserving global public goods, Stern like Stiglitz (2007) 
glimpses that even this economic analysis is not enough. For preservation of 
public goods requires more than enlightened self-interest; it requires a sense of 
public spirit, otherwise free-riding by self-interested participants can destroy a 
system.. Preservation of global public goods calls for global public spiritedness. 
That spirit includes at least the following principle, enunciated in the 2007-8 
Human Development Report and expressed earlier by, for example, Onora 
O’Neill (1996): that the relevant ‘we’ comprises all those whom our actions 
affect. One must treat equitably those with whom one trades and whom one 
affects, regardless of borders. A more maturely human fourth phase is 
required, aware of and sensitive to fellow humans and to humans as parts of a 
fragile ecosphere. 
Section 2 of the paper presents the critique of existing economics-based 
treatments of responding to global warming, taking two of the strongest 
exemplars available: the work of Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz and his 
successor as Chief Economist at the World Bank, Nicholas Stern. We will see 
how they both grope for an ethical vision that can inspire the sorts of societal 
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redirections that their exercises in policy economics identify as essential for 
global stability and human decency. Section 3 suggests that the perspective of 
‘human security’, which has grown out of the fields of socio-economic 
development theory, including development ethics, as well as from critical 
security studies, human ecology and public health, offers more of the necessary 
vision and moral energy. Human security thinking can be seen as a major line 
in development ethics thinking, that takes further the move ‘from economism 
to human development’ (Gasper 2004) and human rights, into a more adequate 
synthesis (Gasper and Truong 2005; 2010). Section 4 compares the potential of 
a human security perspective as a language for human transition to 
sustainability, with the potential of these other prominent policy languages, and 
sums up. 
2   The insufficiency of  conventional economic languages 
Stiglitz: Making things ‘work’? – Fine-tuning incentives to provide and protect 
global public goods 
The lesson here, as in much of the rest of this book, is simple: incentives matter, 
and governments and the international community must work harder to ensure 
that the incentives facing corporations are better aligned with those they touch, 
especially the less powerful in the developing world (Stiglitz 2007: 210) 
Joseph Stiglitz’s incisive and well-intentioned Making Globalization Work (2007) 
offers a virtuoso exercise in progressive technocracy: we must re-engineer the 
market system to ‘get incentives right’, and Stiglitz supposedly shows us how. 
The book uses an untheorised concept of incentives, which Stiglitz defines 
simply as ‘carrots and sticks’ (p.176) in his chapter on climate change, ‘Saving 
the Planet’. Implicitly the incentives are largely monetary; for example, by 
placing tariffs on imports from the USA if that country tacitly subsidises its 
producers by not requiring them to pay for the environmental damage they 
cause (p.177). Stiglitz advocates some use of non-monetary ‘sticks’, such as 
making corporate executives bear criminal liability for environmental 
despoliation for which they are responsible (p.204), a liability which in fact 
would have to be enforceable everywhere in the world. ‘Corporate incentives 
can be reshaped. If we are to make globalization work, they will have to be’ 
(p.189). 
The questions arise: reshaped by whom? quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (who 
will guard the guardians?) and, from Robert Goodin: how can we “motivate 
political morality?”. But Stiglitz only discusses re-engineering of markets, 
without consideration of a need for cultural and political transformations. He 
mostly seeks to avoid or conceal moral argumentation, claiming for example 
that: ‘In Smithian economics, morality played no role’ (p.189) – as if Smith did 
not see that markets cannot work if most people do not willingly follow rules, 
and not merely follow rules because they think they cannot get away with 
breaking them. Similarly, economic growth is presented as self-evidently good 
and as potentially the solvent of most difficulties—‘Their growth [that of 
LDCs] will enhance our growth’ (p.59)—despite Stiglitz’s awareness elsewhere 
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of the severe welfare misdirection given by the GNP indicator (e.g., p.153 ff). 
Finally, human rights are hardly mentioned.2 
Belatedly, some ethical issues creep to the surface in the book’s final 
pages. Stiglitz declares that we are all interconnected; that we should give 
special attention to the interests of the weakest, not, as at present, to the 
strongest (p.278); and that since important values compete we need to make 
value-choice explicit, rather than believe that technocratic calculation can 
suffice. Conceivably some of the book’s earlier concealment is tactical; after 
previous chapters have shown, step by step, the imbalances and iniquities in a 
series of arenas in the post World War Two global system, the final chapter 
gives a value-critical diagnosis of how the system was created by US elites to 
institutionalize their own advantage. All international economic cooperation 
and management was delegated to technocratic organizations which pretend 
that no fundamental value choices are involved in their operations, which as 
result sideline most important values. 
The term ‘we’ becomes prominent in these final pages, as in the following 
component of a proposed ‘new global social contract’ (emphasis in original, 
p.285). 
A recognition that we—developed and less developed countries alike—share one 
planet, and that global warming represents a real threat to that planet—one 
whose effects may be particularly disastrous for some of the developing 
countries; accordingly, we all need to limit carbon emissions—we need to put 
aside our squabbling about who’s to blame and get down to the serious business 
of doing something… (Stiglitz 2007: 285). 
The introduction here of a global ‘we’ comes with an asserted requirement that 
the poor too must limit emissions. 
Any move to a new global social contract will require much evolution of 
perceptions and motivations, not merely a technical exercise of ‘getting 
incentives right’ to sort out ‘market failures’. Only on the very final page of the 
2006 edition does Stiglitz make the required moral step: the ‘Declaration of 
Independence does not say: “all Americans are created equal,” but all men are 
created equal’ (p.292 of 2007 edition). This universalist principle should inspire 
and structure the book as a whole. 
Climate change as market failure, continued: Stern and economic cost-benefit 
analysis 
Climate change is the greatest market failure the world has ever seen (Stern 2007: 
xviii). 
The economics interpretation of public goods is an attempt to discuss aspects 
of life which do not fit the market model, but in terms which are derived from 
that model via comparison. Public goods, in the neoclassical formulation, are 
goods which are non-rivalrous (my consumption does not reduce the 
                                                 
2 Page 291 touches on human rights for virtually the first time. The book’s index 
mentions ‘human rights’ just once: for the fleeting reference on p.6. 
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possibility for your consumption) and/or non-excludable (you cannot prevent 
me from gaining access). In other words, the conditions required for provision 
and allocation of such goods to be relatively satisfactorily arrangeable via 
capitalist enterprises are absent. Given, for example, non-excludability—as 
with respect to access to radiowaves or the atmosphere—positive/favourable 
‘externalities’ exist but a self-interested producer ignores the benefits that 
accrue to others who do not pay him, so that underproduction results, as 
judged in terms of a wider calculus of costs and benefits. Conversely, where 
negative externalities exist, overproduction results, as in the case of processes 
that generate greenhouse-gases. These are types of systemic market failure. 
This conceptualisation of public goods proceeds in terms of what the 
goods are not, rather than of what they are. As with a category like ‘non-
government organisations’, defined only negatively, it leaves us with a 
perspective that may miss core elements of what is involved, in this case 
concerning the spheres of societal reproduction and public meaning-making 
and prioritization (Gasper 2002). It is a theory of public goods based on too 
little understanding of the content in ‘public’. 
Two lines in economics discussions on responding to the problems set by 
public goods and externalities are as follows: first, to create real or virtual 
markets in order to place economic values upon these goods, which can then 
be traded-off against other goods through calculation and judgement – the 
approach of, for example, economic cost-benefit analysis; or, second, to adopt 
required target levels of public good provision or assurance, as derived from 
considerations of basic needs and human rights and/or other considerations, 
including minimum necessary environmental stability, and then to consider 
how to effectively meet these target levels – a type of cost-effectiveness 
analysis. Let us examine these two lines in turn, as highlighted by, respectively, 
the 2007 Stern Review and Stern’s more recent book (2010 edition). 
The Stern Review on climate change (Stern 2007), commissioned by the 
UK government, essayed an economic cost-benefit analysis (ECBA) of climate 
change. All foreseen (monetizable) effects of the present path of economic 
activity and of some possible alternative paths were projected, to then compare 
the costs and benefits of efforts to change the present path. The costs of global 
warming were seen as the ‘consumption losses’ that it causes (for example 
because someone dies prematurely). The commission concluded that measures 
to mitigate impending climate change would be enormously advantageous; the 
costs prevented would be vastly greater than the costs of the mitigation 
measures. The ‘present value’ of the costs of not acting to reduce climate 
change were calculated to be far greater (of the order of 20% of current 
consumption, this year and for ever; p.188) than the present value of the costs 
of acting, even when using what Stern (2010) now acknowledges as the over-
optimistic mainstream picture prevalent in 2006 concerning the speed of 
climate change and the scale of its effects. 
Stern (2007) discusses carefully some limits to the applicability of standard 
ECBA procedures such as the use of a single and fixed rate of discount for 
comparing future values with present values. He stresses that the standard 
procedures were designed for considering relatively small incremental 
investments in very largely stable situations, not for actions of huge magnitude 
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which can change the whole nature of an economy. He passes more quickly by 
the deeper objections to applying a method meant for short- and medium-run 
business calculations instead to long-run decisions that involve life-or-death 
implications for many people, especially poor people and future generations 
(pp. 163-4).  
First, the logic of comparison via market or quasi-market valuations 
employed in ECBA has bounds to its relevance and acceptability, set for 
example by principles of basic human rights. Bounds are set also (in 
combination with human rights principles) by the estimated limits of flexibility 
in our physical environment. Destabilization of the Earth’s regenerative and 
climate cycles cannot realistically be substituted for by having more of other 
capital types: human, social, and human-built physical capital. Structural limits 
must be central in our analysis of climate change. Beyond the limits, things can 
snap. 
Second, the value principles built into ECBA mean the following: only 
monetized effects matter; a rich person’s benefits are considered more 
important, since weighted by his greater purchasing power; distribution is 
unimportant – gains to the richer can (and typically do) outweigh costs counted 
for the poorer and can even (and often easily do) outweigh the deaths of the 
poor. The same evaluation approach that serves in this case to justify global 
warming mitigation programmes is used by the UK government to justify 
climate-damaging airport expansions; for the minutes saved for highly-paid 
executives readily outweigh, in this monetary calculus, the loss of livelihood 
and even loss of life for very poor people elsewhere as result of increasing 
desertification, climate instability and sea level rise (Monbiot 2008). The 
language of economics can fundamentally misdirect us. 
The key decisions in policy analysis are made before analysts apply a 
technique. They are the decisions about choice of technique. Built-in to the 
techniques are ‘framing’ decisions, about who and what are to be considered – 
what to include and with what weights (e.g., in ECBA we include monetized 
values that disproportionately reflect the interests of the rich), implicitly what 
things to leave out (in ECBA we exclude non-monetized values and penniless 
people), and tacit assumptions about the range of validity of a technique. 
ECBA assumes that any type of future cost, including lost lives, can 
legitimately be mathematically discounted in the same way as potential 
monetary benefits or costs (Shue 2006). So the poor, whose lives are already 
largely discounted through use of a monetary calculus in which their activities 
have little weight, are scientifically ‘written off’ when the loss of their 
‘consumption streams’ is outweighed by the growth of consumption streams of 
the already rich. While the commensuration in ECBA is helpful and legitimate 
when dealing with legitimately commensurated goods, when morally non-
commensurable criteria pull sharply in different directions the appropriate 
advice must not be to fabricate complex imputed comparisons but to seek a 
different, better option that does not involve that ‘trade-off’, the sacrifice of 
what should not be sacrificed (Etzioni 1991). We should reject an option that 
causes deaths for the sake of saving minutes for business travellers, and force 
ourselves to create and consider other options (Shue 2006).   
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The Stern Review insisted on including and highlighting an ECBA of 
investments in mitigation of and adaptation to global warming, though it 
warned: ‘Such exercises should be viewed with some circumspection’ (Stern 
2007:34). The choice for inclusion appears to have been, first, for purposes of 
political and public communication in hostile settings. Credibility in many elite 
circuits of British economic decision-making required simplistic, supposedly 
sophisticated, calculations. Secondly, ECBA constitutes the worldview in 
which generations of economists have been trained since the 1960s, 
concerning how to extend market economics principles to analyse and 
supplement a world of imperfect markets and market failures. It is how Stern 
and Stiglitz and their generation of economists themselves think.3  
It reflects also, thirdly, a continuing commitment to economic growth. 
ECBA is a tool of ‘welfare’ maximization within a perspective of managing and 
pursuing economic growth (Little and Mirrlees, 1974; Dasgupta et al., 1972). 
The Stern Review was very assertive that high income countries did not need 
to forego ‘strong’ economic growth (see e.g. pp. xvii, 267). While more demure 
on this, and with emphasis instead on LDCs’ right to growth and their need to 
have it if they are to cooperate, Stern’s new book still quietly advocates rich 
country economic growth, for in fact the same reasons, even though Stern is 
now more worried about the little time available for changing direction and 
about the limited braking powers of markets. Stern judges that only responses 
to climate change that allow and promote rapid (economic) growth in the 
South—but also, he implies, and sometimes explicitly says, in the North too4—
will be internally consistent and feasible.  
Lastly, the choice reflected also the significantly lesser degree of worry that 
Stern and colleagues still had in 2006 about the costs of climate change than he 
had when writing Blueprint just three years later. In 2006 it still seemed to make 
sense to proceed in terms of ECBA’s ‘nicely-calculated less or more’, rather 
than of ensuring endangered human security. The Review’s accumulation of 
findings about the dangers of ‘threshold effects’, such as rapid acceleration of 
the melting of the polar ice-caps, of extreme events, and of interactions 
between various of the separately estimated possible negative effects (2007: 
Ch.3), go well beyond the scenarios conservatively modelled by IPCC, 5 and 
implied the need for a type of thinking different from business-derived 
utilitarian calculation. But that step was not taken. Leaving the discussion in 
market-based economic terms could then be used by writers like Bjorn 
                                                 
3 “The appropriate response to a substantial market failure is not to abandon markets 
but to act directly to fix it” (Stern 2010: 11), for example through better information 
flows, including through raising the price of options that cause damage. But this 
breaks down when we talk of the market for kidnapping, the market for child sex, and 
even the market for commodities that indirectly cause loss of other people’s habitats, 
their livelihoods, and sometimes their lives. 
4 E.g., pp. 4, 8, 10. Stern is no Green economist, in contrast to say Tim Jackson, chief 
economist of the UK Sustainable Development Commission, who researches on 
prosperity and progress without economic growth. 
5 IPCC (the International Panel on Climate Change) has always been conservative in 
its estimates (Stern 2010: 32), to try to maintain consensus support amongst scientists 
and credibility amongst wider publics who do not welcome bad news. 
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Lomborg (2007) and their sponsors, to argue that markets show us that people 
want economic growth now so much and do not care enough about the future 
risks, that we should rationally reject major current adjustments aimed to 
reduce the possible massive costs and risks for the next generations.  
On the other hand, by framing its ECBA, like most of its analysis, at a 
global and not a national level, the Stern Review moved in one key respect 
beyond the parochialism of conventional economic analyses. It carried those 
analyses’ air of political authority into a new arena, declaring that a nationally 
framed discussion of the costs and benefits associated with climate change 
would be pointless, for only globally coordinated action has a chance of 
effectiveness when we face such massive and wide-spreading external effects 
(2007: 49). The global ECBA allows Bangladeshi delta-dwellers’ lives to be 
written-off for the sake of saved minutes for businessmen, but that happens 
already via market calculations. The longer-term incremental impact of putting 
policy discussions into a global normative framework might be to help open 
for wider critique from global publics some of the iniquities that are 
implemented through market structures and condoned via economic 
calculation. 
Economics as handmaiden: Stern’s Blueprint for…How We Can Save the 
World 
Stern’s new book is interestingly different from the Stern Review, even if not 
fundamentally changed. He still speaks emphatically “as an economist”, not 
least when seeking at the outset to establish his grounds of authority. He asks: 
‘What are the magnitudes, in economic terms, of the risks which the science 
has identified?’ (2010: 2), rather than of ‘in human terms’. He talks of ‘the 
economy’, rather than of society or humanity, and of ‘economic policy’ rather 
than public policy (e.g., pp. 2, 11); and he uses without qualification the 
concept of ‘efficiency’, by which he in general means efficiency in economic 
terms, as assessed in terms of market purchasing power and the resulting 
market- or market-equivalent values. The Stern Review similarly constantly 
declared its use of ‘many recent advances’ in economics, as a way to build its 
authority and to reduce the possibility of any feeling by politicians and publics 
that the Review criticised their past choices. 
Now, after three years of intense debate with growth-first economists and 
climate skeptics such as Lomborg, Blueprint’s chapter 5 on ‘Ethics, discounting 
and the case for action’ includes a stronger critique of the assumption that 
society’s ethical values can be reliably imputed by looking at market values. 
Stern spells out why market valuations and ECBA are not adequate for our 
biggest decisions, for which forms of public discussion and politics are 
required. And he treads a tightrope in trying to balance between what he 
considers politically feasible and palatable and the increasingly somber natural 
science projections that he is now aware of. 
1. “…emissions are growing substantially faster than previously thought” 
(2010: 22). 
2. The impact of these emissions on greenhouse gas (GHG) levels in the 
atmosphere is much quicker than previously expected, since the carbon-
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absorption capacity of the oceans is estimated now as lower than believed 
a few years ago. The target ceiling GHG level of 450 ppm (parts per 
million) CO2-equivalent, widely identified as a safe level to prevent major 
temperature rises, appears extremely likely to be exceeded. We are already 
almost that high. Stern now takes 500 ppm as a realistic target, hopefully 
both attainable and yet tolerable in its consequences. It is well below the 
550 ppm sometimes emolliently adopted in his 2007 Review (e.g., p.337) 
even though he recognised there that ‘550 pm CO2-e would be a 
dangerous place to be’ (p.329). 
3. For, what are the implications of these GHG levels for temperatures? The 
500 ppm target level almost certainly will not prevent a global temperature 
rise of more than the 2 degrees C that has been widely considered as the 
maximum ‘safe’ increase, but it should avoid a 3 degrees rise that is 
estimated to bring high risk of more severe destabilization, including ‘a 
high risk that the major rainforests will collapse’, meaning the loss of 
immense ‘carbon-sinks’ (Stern 2010: 29). 
4. Recent research suggests that the impacts of these temperature rises on 
climate and physical geography will be more severe and more damaging 
than estimated even a few years ago by the IPCC and the Stern Review 
(Stern 2010: 27, 39). To take one small but striking example of current 
trends: ‘average glacial retreat in Bhutan…is 30-40 metres per year’ (2010: 
29). 
5. Recent research also shows that the impacts on human populations of 
these changes in climate and physical geography will, in turn, be worse 
than previously estimated – with, in particular, massive risks for the low-
income populations of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In sum, there are great risks of irreversible mega-damage. 
Stern therefore proposes and uses a 500 ppm GHG ceiling in this 
‘Blueprint’ to ‘Save the World and Create Prosperity’. He deems such a ceiling 
to be: feasible, technically and politically; safe, enough, just about; and an 
economically attractive investment. The rough estimate he gives of the costs 
required for respecting a 500 ppm ceiling is 2% per annum of world product 
(2010: 48), for the next 50 years – very little compared to the estimated risks 
and costs of climate collapse. 
Blueprint gives more attention than did the Stern Review to issues of rights-
and-duties, and much less emphasis to ECBA calculations. In effect Stern 
recognises that their zone of relevance has been left behind. Implicitly, we 
need value-guidelines from outside economics. As seen above, he estimates a 
maximum acceptable level of GHG concentration, not on the basis of 
economic calculation but from a mixture of environmental, political and 
human rights type estimations; then takes that as a given, not something to be 
traded-off against other objectives expressed in market values, and uses a sort 
of cost-effectiveness analysis to look for methods (including market-based 
methods, but also many others) to fulfil that fixed objective. This line of 
reasoning could be found in parts of the 2007 Review also, but with less 
prominence than the ECBA. 
How to implement the 500 GHG ppm ceiling? Since Stern assumes 
continuing economic growth, worldwide—as he thinks that without it there 
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can never be the political agreement and stability required to make the required 
changes—respecting the ceiling requires reduction by 2050 of GHG 
emissions-per-unit-output by a fearsome 80% or so overall. Having used the 
‘economics of risk’ to advocate emissions ceilings, he applies the ‘economics of 
cost’ to advocate their implementation via markets for the allocation and 
reallocation of emission rights, on grounds of (economic) efficiency (2010: 99). 
Taxes on GHG emissions would be too uncertain in their estimation and 
impact, therefore he advocates instead quotas which can then be traded.6 A 
quota system gives us the necessary certainty about total emissions. In addition, 
regulations about required performance standards and maximum permissible 
emissions will be necessary to counteract businesses’ and consumers’ fallibility 
and inertia, for example over use of energy-saving methods such as low-energy 
light-bulbs. 
Creation and promotion of suitable technologies requires enormous state 
involvement and support, given the lags, risks, and externalities involved. Past 
experience shows the dangers of inertia: investment worldwide in energy 
research is tiny and halved in the 1980s and 90s, to about 6% of the level of 
energy subsidies (Stern 2010: 113). This suggests the likelihood of 
governmental as well as societal inaction when immediate economic and 
political pressure is absent. Having discussed the choices of ‘carrots’ and 
‘sticks’ to apply to producers and consumers, Stern’s chapter 6 on ‘Policies to 
reduce emissions’ ends with mention of institutions. In particular he calls for 
action coalitions to generate ideas and commitment in national discussion fora 
(such as the 2007 Grenelle d’Environnement in France) and to maintain 
pressure on governments for follow-up. A further system of sticks and carrots 
can be set up to induce action on commitments made in such fora; for 
example, the UK Government must nowadays explain to Parliament if it does 
not accept the advice of the Climate Change Commission, and is legally 
required to follow whatever environmental targets it does set itself (Stern  
2010: 122). 
In other words, we can try to devise further clever carrots and sticks to 
induce governments to generate and enforce carrots and sticks for others. Yet, 
to repeat, the record of the past two generations is mostly of inertia. Will even 
‘many recent advances in economics’ make much difference to this? Who will 
motivate the motivators? 
But: “how to motivate action”?7 
After the extended policy design presented in its chapter 6, Stern’s Blueprint 
moves in the next chapter beyond the world of the carrot and stick. Without 
highlighting that he now transcends that level of discussion, conducted in 
terms of assumed motives of narrow self-interest (taxes, regulations, carbon 
pricing, etc.), Stern in effect accepts in his Ch.7—‘Individuals, firms, 
communities: the power of example’—that those types of incentive are not 
                                                 
6 Stiglitz differs, arguing that there will be no agreement on national target levels. He 
prefers a global carbon tax (2007: 180-182). 
7 Stern (2010: 124). 
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enough, because, implicitly, that picture of motivation and theory of private 
and public action is not enough (cf. Stretton and Orchard 1994; Crawford 
2009). We need attention to other types and channels of motivation and 
behaviour-change. In the terms of policy theory, beyond carrots and sticks lie 
‘sermons’ and dialogue (Bemelmans-Videc et al., 1998; Sinha and Gasper, 
2009), including education, information-sharing, and promotion of new and 
old ideals and of culture-change. 
Inducing or changing deeply rooted patterns of action requires change of 
ideas, perceptions and pictures of what is possible, expected and acceptable; 
for example, changes in the public’s active expectations regarding business 
behaviour. Environment-friendliness must become an essential criterion for 
corporate respectability. Corporations would then, Stern hopes, start to lobby 
governments to introduce more environment-friendly policies rather than the 
reverse; both because it will help their image and because those policies will 
give them a more stable future for which they can securely plan (2010: 138). 
Changing perceptions and bridging the gaps between thought and action 
require presentation of vivid concrete examples, and Stern tries to provide 
many in this chapter 7. 
The same sequence of discussion—a technocratic policy design, as in 
chapter 6, followed by a search for the human meanings that could motivate its 
implementation, as in chapter 7—recurs in the remaining chapters. Chapter 8 
proposes ‘The structure of a ‘global deal’, a plan for how to progress in a world 
of multiple stakeholders with different and partly competing interests and 
perspectives. Unless different actions fit together and reinforce each other, 
then many of the individual actions will not be started in isolation or will not 
work. Rich countries must commit unilaterally to major emissions cuts and 
invest greatly in new technologies, if there is to be a chance that the currently 
low and low-middle income countries will—if rich countries have met their 
commitments and appropriate financing mechanisms are established—agree by 
2020 to targets and time-paths for emissions reduction. 2020 is the end of the 
time-window of opportunity for Stern’s package of adjustment-without-
(much)-pain to be workable. After the elaborate discussion, in this his longest 
chapter, of proposals for emergence of a global carbon market, a program to 
halve deforestation, and so on, the following chapters 9 (‘Building and 
Sustaining Action’) and 10 (‘A Planet in Peril’) turn to how to make such 
schemes attract attention and support and to truly take-off.  
In the same fashion as Stiglitz did at the end of his book, after chapters of 
technocratic detail Stern shifts, without highlighting the change of register and 
change of implicit model of persons and of public action, to questions of 
solidarity and altruism, vision and inspiration: ‘a spirit of collaboration’ (2010: 
181) and ‘commitment and communication’ (p.182). Whereas in the Stern 
Review, discussion at this point in the argument was about ‘behavioural and 
organisational factors affecting economic rationality in decision-making’ (2007: 
427), and attitude change received only three pages (448-451) out of 700, the 
new book devotes a large part of its chapters 7 and 9 to the theme. After the 
details of carbon trading Stern now finds it necessary to invoke the, very 
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different, spirit of Gandhi and Mandela (2010: 182-3). Evidently we require 
something more than ‘recent advances in economics’.8 
Without firmly saying so, Stern here recognises that cooperation around 
(global) public goods cannot be conducted only in ‘economic man’ terms, via 
clever manipulation of carrots and sticks. First, people are not economic men, 
unflagging and unfailing calculators of narrow self-interest. They fail in this 
calculation very often (see also Stern 2007, Ch.17). For example the narrow-
spirited past estimates of how the U.S. may gain in various ways from global 
warming, in contrast to at-risk countries in the tropics, underestimated how 
‘because of the United States’ vast wealth, the value of the potential damage 
[from climate disruption and extreme climate events like Hurricane Katrina], 
even if it is less extensive, will be enormous’ (Stiglitz, 2007: 170). People are 
both unhabituated and often unable to calculate indirect effects (such as the 
impacts on the U.S. of disruption in the tropics, via migration, disease, conflict, 
fundamentalist movements and the like), and thus fail to move to the stage of 
enlightened self-interest. Ironically, incorporation of such effects is more likely 
to occur if people move beyond that stage of self-conscious calculation of 
private interest, to a stance of sympathetic cooperation with others. For they 
then become more attuned to impacts on others and the resulting indirect 
effects on themselves. Secondly, for other reasons too, co-operativeness is a 
public good needed for the effective operation of markets. Not least, what will 
motivate the motivators and policy managers? Shared norms and institutions 
are required for shared security.  
Public action around public goods requires an appropriate feeling of what 
is the public, including some sympathetic feeling for ‘distant others’ and future 
generations. And besides such reflection or unconscious adaptation concerning 
who are ‘we’, it will sometimes require reflection on: Who am I, what is my 
‘self’, and what really is its ‘interest’: what is a good life? Stern fails to 
investigate the images of identity and ‘interests’ that structure and constrain 
behaviour (in contrast to, for example, Jackson 2006). He offers a policy 
‘blueprint’ rather than serious reflection on motivational values; and works 
with insufficiently examined assumptions about the identity of the ‘We’ 
(Treasury and World Bank economists; well-intentioned Establishment 
advisers) who supposedly can, in the title of his book, ‘Save the World’. 
                                                 
8 These elements could conceivably be compatible within an overall system—Bill 
Drayton, a father of emissions trading, is also the father of Ashoka, the global 
foundation for promoting progressive social entrepreneurship (Bornstein 2004)—but 
we require more self-conscious and self-critical attention to how that could be so. 
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3   Human security thinking 
Human security thinking provides us with a more adequate framework for 
these tasks. I have elsewhere summarised such thinking as follows: 
A human security perspective…involves a system of ideas: a focus on individual 
human persons and on stability in fulfilment of their basic needs; attention to 
causal interconnections regardless of conventional disciplinary boundaries; and 
emphasis on ‘tipping points’ and felt insecurities. It includes strong attention to 
the contents of individual person’s lives and to human depth in understanding of 
security; a synthesis of features from the normative languages of human needs, 
human rights and human development; and a framework for situation-specific 
wide-ranging explanatory syntheses. (Gasper 2009: 16) 
Such a framework has been known under the name ‘human security’ since the 
early 1990s, especially following the Human Development Report 1994 
(UNDP 1994). But it had been emerging for a generation before that under 
diverse other names: in work on basic human needs, on human ecology, and 
on conflict, violence and peace, such as by the Palme Commission and the 
South American Peace Commission in the 1980s. It is currently championed in 
particular by the Human Security Network of around a dozen medium-powers 
such as Canada, Norway and the Netherlands, by the governments of Japan 
and Thailand, and by a variety of organizations including UNESCO (e.g., 
UNESCO 2008) and the U.N. University Institute for Environment and 
Human Security (UNU-EHS). One leading articulation of the perspective is 
the volume Human Security Now (CHS, 2003) by the Commission on Human 
Security, 2001-3, chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen that was 
commissioned by the UN Secretary-General and the Government of Japan. 
We will consider the perspective in four stages. First, we look at the 
concept of ‘human security’ and note a family of concept-variants around a 
defensible core meaning. Its emergence in the context of the UNDP Human 
Development Reports and its relation to the ideas of human development and 
human rights deserve attention from the outset. Second, we are dealing with a 
discourse, a system of ideas, as introduced above, not merely a single concept. 
The disputes over defining the concept become relatively minor—except in 
terms of who claims ‘ownership’ and controls research funding—when the 
system of ideas is grasped. Third, the discourse has a number of characteristic 
roles, as a ‘boundary object’ and policy leitmotif, accessible and useful to a 
variety of audiences including for bringing in unconventional themes and 
guiding relevant policy analyses. Fourth, the discourse in various ways 
synthesises and transcends several prior discourses, including those of human 
rights and human development. It is not a separate add-on or rival, but a 
member of a larger discourse family. In Section 4 we will address this last 
theme with reference to sustainability and climate change. 
The concept of human security, within the family of human discourses 
The United Nations-led work on ‘human development’, now established for 20 
years, involves: a reaction against prevalent inhuman styles of development, 
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and a move away from a focus on having things, in national aggregate, to a 
focus on how all individual people can live; in a context of understanding the 
real interconnections between spheres of experience that have been 
conventionally treated as separate, such as economy, environment, 
displacement, conflict, disease and migration. Neglect of those connections 
contributes to the inhumanity of prevalent development approaches. This last 
feature, the stress on interconnection, can be given the name ‘joined-up 
thinking’. Equally important is the ‘joined-up feeling’ that is implicit in 
attention to how all human individuals live, regardless of their purchasing 
power and of their place of birth or residence. This last feature builds on ideas 
of human dignity and basic human rights. 
We need to go further than the original human development discourse, 
represented by the Human Development Reports at global, national and 
subnational levels, to think more about meanings and aspects of the central 
notion: ‘human’. Human security discourse does so. It focuses on how people 
seek security of various sorts—physical, economic, and psychological—and on 
the priority capacities and vulnerabilities that form the grounds for basic rights. 
Human security discourse’s narrower focus has helped us to go deeper, to ask 
and explore more about what is distinctive and of priority in ‘human’, and 
ultimately to understand more broadly. Paradoxically, less has been in some 
respects more. The discourse involves a stronger concern with felt experience 
than in most of the legal-led work on human rights and economics-led work 
on human development. It leads us to close concern with the textures of 
everyday life and connects strongly to human subjectivity, thereby increasing 
both explanatory force and motivational power. To more individualistic human 
rights thinking it adds an emphasis on the human species as a whole and on 
our shared security, insecurity and vulnerability.  
The concept of human security thus concerns the security of human 
persons against important threats to their basic needs. It represents a 
prioritising format within human development thinking: a focus on the priority 
objectives within the human development approach’s concern for expansion of 
the attainable ‘doings and beings’ that ‘we have reason to value’. Priority, 
needs-based, objectives are given human rights status. So, attention is given to: 
guaranteed minima per person, not only to expansion, aggregates and averages; 
top priority areas, not all valued areas; guarantees, basic rights for all, not only 
nice talk followed in practice by sacrifice of the weak; and stability, not just 
overall average fulfilment over time.  
In comparison to conventional concepts of security, human security 
analysis involves a focus on the security of all individual persons not of general 
entities such as the state or average national income; and second, a wider scope 
in the areas considered under ‘security’, corresponding to basic human needs. 
Leading on from this it also involves a wider scope in, thirdly, attention to 
contributory factors, and fourthly and consequently, in attention to possible 
countermeasures to insecurity (Gasper 2010). 
Different formulations circulate and compete concerning what are these 
basic values, threats to which form threats to human security. These 
differences lead to definitions that range from as narrow as bodily security 
against intentional physical threats, through ‘freedom from fear and freedom 
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from want’, to security in terms of quantity of years lived (adjusted for life 
quality) against all threats to life, whether physical or not and intentional or not 
(Picciotto et al. 2007). The diversity of definitions is not a real problem; 
different formulations can fit different socio-political and decision-making 
contexts. All the formulations involve a shift to a concern with major threats to 
major values in the lives of ordinary people, compared to traditional security 
studies’ preoccupation with the state and its preservation. 
A discourse not just a concept 
Behind the definitional features at the concept level lie bigger themes at the 
discourse level: the motivating concern of ‘joined-up feeling’, in a form 
adapted from human rights work, and holistic ‘joined-up thinking’, giving 
wide-ranging attention across human experience, especially to transgressive 
causal interconnections, transgressive with respect to the territorial habits of 
established disciplines such as economics or international relations (Gasper and 
Truong, 2005, 2010). The attention to interconnections involves an awareness 
of fragility, possible ‘tipping points’ and even breaking points in social, physical 
and biological systems.9 This joined-up thinking means that definitional 
disputes decline in significance. Even if one uses a narrow physical violence 
definition of human security, use also of a transdisciplinary causal perspective, 
in which different forms of insecurity – physical, political, environmental, 
health, economic, military, psychological – can all strongly affect each other, 
means that both in analysis and action one must engage broadly across areas of 
‘non-traditional security’. 
Leading on from the immersion in the basics of daily experience, the 
themes of joined-up feeling and joined-up thinking connect in a focus on 
interpersonal relationships not just on the range of valued choices, in contrast 
to ‘human development’ theory. The combination of the two themes also 
strengthens the basis for human solidarity. ‘Joined-up thinking’ can reinforce 
‘joined-up feeling’: awareness of effects—actual, probable or possible—on 
others from one’s actions may support feelings of sympathy, even 
responsibility; and awareness of boomerang effects—actual, probable or 
possible—on oneself can generate feelings of caution and actions of 
precaution. Similarly, feelings of solidarity across both time and space together, 
in other words solidarity with future generations in other parts of the world, 
may be promoted by joined-up thinking that raises awareness that the security 
of your inheritors in your ‘own’ family and society will depend on the security 
of their global contemporaries and thus on the security of your contemporaries 
too. 
Compared to the older language of ‘basic human needs’, the ‘human 
security’ language adds an orientation to the dangers of triggering fundamental 
damage when we lapse below or exceed certain thresholds; and it increases 
                                                 
9 UNESCO’s survey of its research on human security, and of expert views on 
experiences with the concept and approach (2008: 133 ff), unfortunately conflates the 
issue of thresholds, beyond which there is accelerated and dangerous change, with the 
more extreme notion of ‘point of no return’. 
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attention to feelings and subjectivity, besides objective life circumstances. In 
both respects it increases explanatory perceptiveness. Compared to the older 
language of ‘human development’, the human security language adds attention 
to the stability, not just the extent, of valued opportunities and attainments, 
and a prioritizing focus on access to basic goods, including with respect to each 
individual, not only in aggregate. This leads it to engage further with the 
mundane, quotidian realities of life as lived and felt, and to reflect on what 
‘human’ means: to realise that we are ‘encumbered subjects’, each with a body, 
gender, emotions, identity, and a life-cycle. Human security discourse thus 
potentially has additional emotional and motivational appeal as well as greater 
explanatory insight. 
Roles of human security discourse 
The concept of human security functions as a ‘boundary object’ that brings 
different intellectual and policy communities into conversation (Gasper 2005). 
Human security discourse functions as a boundary discourse that serves to 
open up, reorient and enliven attention to unconventional but fundamental 
problems such as climate change. 
The sociologies of science and policy indicate that for fruitful (or even 
any) communication to occur between different scientific and/or policy 
groups, suitable ‘boundary work’ activities of bridging, bonding and broking 
are required. The activities need to be instituted in certain boundary objects—
certain ideas, organizations and practices—that are found usable and helpful by 
each side (see e.g. Jasanoff & Wynne 1998). Study of boundary work has 
shown that a high proportion of creative advances occur in this way (see e.g. 
Dogan & Pahre 1990). While having to beware of the danger of total 
dissipation of meaning, one must be prepared to tolerate some ambiguity in 
boundary objects.  
Many authors now find the concept and discourse of human security to 
be, in effect, valuable boundary objects in making progress on major global 
challenges, not least for climate change (O’Brien et al., 2010). For example: 
it is possible that the human security concept will serve as an inclusive meeting 
place to all the stakeholders because of the simplicity of its conception, with less 
possibility of discrimination based on expertise areas or degrees of literacy than 
more elaborated concepts such as those promoting sustainability (Gomez and 
Saito, 2007: 14); 
human security provides a powerful “political leitmotif” for particular states and 
multilateral actors by fulfilling selected functions in the process of agenda-setting, 
decision-making and implementation … [O]veremphasising the shortcomings of 
leitmotifs means to underestimate their potential, which exactly relies on its 
ambiguity/flexibility (Werthes and Debiel 2006: 8, 15).   
This policy leitmotif has proven to be operational and fruitful when used in a 
flexible adaptive way. A human security approach does not require that we 
study the effect of everything on everything else, nor does it propose a single 
fixed and precise policy research blueprint or conceptual grid such as given in 
economic cost-benefit analysis. Its key roles are to generate an appropriate 
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broad and flexible orientation, and an openness to which are the priority 
threats and key linkages in particular situations; it leaves their identification to 
be done case-by-case. We see this exemplified in the series of national Human 
Development Reports that have adopted a human security approach (see the 
survey by Jolly & BasuRay, 2007), and the series of regional surveys 
commissioned by UNESCO (summarized in UNESCO 2008), not least the 
surveys of Eastern Europe (Tadjbakhsh & Tomescu-Hatto 2007) and Western 
Europe (Burgess et al. 2007). 
4  A language for transition? 
The steps required: rethinking well-being and relationships to others and to the 
Earth 
How we approach issues of climate change—with what categories, criteria and 
degree of concern—depends on how we identify and situate ourselves causally 
and affectively in the world. What do we see ourselves as primarily: members 
of an Earth community, a common humanity; or members of some limited 
human community; or purely as individuals? How far do we see shared 
interests between people, thanks to pervasive causal interdependence? How far 
do we value other people and their interests? 
The Earth Charter and the Great Transition project (Raskin et al. 2002; 
Raskin 2006) identify three value shifts required for human sustainability on 
earth: from a preoccupation with the acquisition and consumption of 
commodities to a broader and deeper picture of what gives quality of life; from 
an overwhelming individualism to a human solidarity, based indeed on respect 
for individuals; and from an attitude of mastery and domination of nature to an 
attitude of stewardship for ‘Mother Earth’. Critically, these value transitions 
involve shifts in perception. We remain in aggregate enormously distant even 
from the first shift, to focus on quality of life rather than on volume of 
commercial throughput. The ‘progressive’ Stern Review conducted its analyses 
largely in terms of impacts on the profoundly misleading criterion of per capita 
GDP, arguably thereby misdirecting much of the discussion. 
With relevance especially to the second of the indicated shifts, towards 
greater human solidarity, but also to the first one, on rethinking quality-of-life, 
Martha Nussbaum proposes that to have ‘people who can function with 
sensitivity and alertness as citizens of the whole world’ (1997: 8), the following 
capacities are necessary: ‘the capacity for critical examination of oneself and 
one’s traditions’ (p.9); ‘ability to see [ourselves] not simply as citizens of some 
local region or group’ (p.10); and perhaps most central and underlying the 
other two: ‘the narrative imagination. This means the ability to think what it 
might be like to be in the shoes of a person different from oneself’ (pp.10-11). 
These capacities are capacities of perception. How can they be promoted? 
We—humans—perceive and act in large part through language. The 
transitions in human societies to move to sustainable pathways require 
languages for transition, not merely cost-benefit calculations, ‘blueprints’, plans 
for incentives, or even talk of respecting and enhancing human rights and 
reasoned freedoms. While all are relevant in varying degrees, none of these 
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ways of talking and thinking contains an adequate vision of humanity, 
humanity on Earth, as pervasively interconnected and mutually constitutive, 
causally, semiotically and affectively. By ‘language’ we refer here to a way of 
‘seeing’, of giving and making sense: a discourse, not merely a list of separable 
concepts and rules. I suggest specifically that human security thinking 
promotes two essential qualities: the capacity of narrative imagination and the 
perception of an intensively interconnected global ecosystem which we share. 
Compared to the other languages mentioned here, it thus adds importantly in 
terms of both logos and pathos to understanding and preserving ‘global public 
goods’, and favours the fundamental changes of perspective that are needed in 
how people perceive our shared interests and shared humanity. 
Human security thinking and the logos and pathos of argumentation on global 
public goods 
Human security thinking emphasises and extends the logic of global public 
goods, in particular the logic of global public health: that there can be no 
security in one neighbourhood alone. The public goods jeopardised by global 
warming on the scale that is being generated by current emissions levels and 
trends are so fundamental that all countries will be damaged, including rich 
temperate-zone countries, directly and also indirectly through the backwash 
effects of multidimensional crises in many low-income tropical and subtropical 
countries. 
Human security thinking goes somewhat further, and crucially so. It 
promotes ideas of human worth, and human co-membership in a global 
ecological system, ideas that could motivate cooperation to supply and 
maintain global public goods. Public goods provision cannot be reduced solely 
to calculations of self-interest, otherwise free-riding by selfish participants can 
easily destroy the system. As we saw, stable and sufficient provision of public 
goods rests also on public spiritedness: pride in and commitment to the 
collectivity. Authors like Stiglitz and Stern have participated vigorously over 
the past generation in, and indeed led, an instrumentalist, economistic, 
reductive and alienated style of treatment of public goods (Stretton and 
Orchard 1994). While having the merit of giving strong attention to public 
goods, they have promoted a mindset derived from market economics—with 
an assumption of a world essentially of clever selfish calculators—that lacks 
ingredients that are essential for environmental preservation and for survival 
with equity. To counterbalance this they presume a wise and benevolent central 
disposer, a God-like Benthamite authority, who will receive and implement 
their technical advice; rather than a real modern polity, the product and 
producer of capitalist consumerism and of the forms of electoral democracy 
that this coexists with and controls. We saw that Stiglitz was forced to invoke 
the spirit of universal human rights, on his final page, when seeking to justify 
and energize the action required to ‘Make Globalization Work’ and Stern was 
left to belatedly invoke the spirit of Gandhi and Mandela when seeking to 
imbue motivation to act on his policy blueprint. But such spirit—and the 
spirits of public-spiritedness, cooperativeness and human rights—could be 
incompatible with other aspects of Stiglitz and Stern’s programmes. A 
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conception of human security offers a more integrated and cohesive 
perspective. 
Human security thinking and the narrative imagination 
There is overwhelming agreement that, while the holistic aspect and non-fixed 
definition of human security is a problem that continues to draw criticism and 
doubt as to the efficacy of the concept, it is precisely its breadth and 
multidimensionality that make it relevant. (UNESCO 2008: 136). 
Human security thinking involves attention to a diverse but situation-specific 
set of interacting threats and how they affect the lives of ordinary individuals, 
especially the most vulnerable. The sheer range of factors and of their 
interconnections means that the type of assertive story-telling found in 
conventional economics – if we do X then Y will follow – is unattainable. 
Instead a more self-aware storytelling results: ‘here is what might result from 
some current factors and their possible linkages’; ‘there lies another possible 
future and what might lead to it’. 
This type of storytelling has been formalized in the scenarios approach 
that is well developed in futures studies (see e.g., a special issue of the journal 
Development, 47(4), 2004, or www.GTInitiative.org). Scenarios are explicitly 
stories, using pictures, figures and charts as well as words, about how an 
ensemble of interacting forces could drive events. They give us a way to better 
grasp the range of possible futures, to sense the diverse potentials of complex 
interactions. They essay holistic interdisciplinary analysis, in a simplified way 
that retains manageability but at the same time reveals risks, possibilities and 
opportunities that can otherwise be overlooked.10 They thereby help to counter 
both over-confidence and passivity. Scenarios help people to perceive 
connections and possibilities that are normally screened out by their 
conventional mental frames and routines and authority structures. They free-
up thinking. They convey events and choices in a way that fits the way we 
experience them in reality, and thus do better than abstract models, for 
building the links through from exposure to understanding to communication 
                                                 
10 The Stern Review for example contains separate chapters on economic costs of 
climate change in rich countries and in poor countries, each based on an accumulation 
across different sectors of quantitative projections concerning impacts. This approach 
underweights 1. the non-quantified effects such as political instability, 2. the 
interactions between sectors, such as the impacts of political instability, especially 
when that goes beyond routine minor variation, and 3. the impacts on rich countries 
of instability in poor countries, again especially outside the range that can be projected 
by quantitative analysis of past variation. Thus the chapter on rich countries notes 
briefly ‘Large-scale shocks and financial contagion originating from poorer countries 
who are more vulnerable to climate change (Chapter 4) will also pose growing risks 
for rich countries, with increasing pressures for large-scale migration and political 
instability’ (Stern 2007, p.139). It provides another perfunctory mention in its final 
two sentences (p.158), but does not incorporate those factors in its many pages of 
costing possible individual impacts in rich countries. Fig. 6.3 and associated text 
(pp.171-3) show some of these fundamental biases in past economic modelling of 
climate change impacts. 
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to credence to active response. Human security thinking can be seen as a 
vehicle for generating relevant scenarios, in contrast to misleadingly assertive 
simplistic stories, about say ‘the economy’, projected for decades ahead.  
Narrative imagination in a broader sense than meant by Nussbaum—not 
only sensitivity towards others but also the ability to think about how the 
world will be if some things become different for oneself, for example as one 
ages—is often needed in order to generate changes even in one’s self-
interested patterns of action. Many of the people who fail to save adequately 
towards their retirement are financially well able to do so. And similarly many, 
probably most, people fail to seriously consider how life will become for them, 
as well as their children and grandchildren, as greenhouse-gas driven climate 
change unfolds. 
Story-telling is influential because it feels real: it links past, present, and 
future, in relation to imaginable real human actors. When we try to explain a 
human situation, we describe who are the characters/actors, who did what to 
whom (the past), and why, the motives, mechanisms and emotions, which 
together lead us into the future. Stories typically contain and evoke emotions 
which are remembered too, and help us in later recall and activation of the 
associated ideas and lessons. Stories can strengthen the narrative imagination, 
the ability to imagine what it is like to be someone else. Human security 
narratives (like Raskin et al. 2002; Raskin 2006) think concretely about the 
impacts of possible future scenarios for the lives of ordinary vulnerable 
individuals, in terms of their physical security, food security and other 
economic security, physical and mental health, security of habitat and 
affiliation. They thereby increase awareness of shared humanity, and of what 
we substantively share—specific forms of fragility, vulnerability, emotion—
beyond more abstracted characterisations in terms of freedom, dignity or 
abilities to desire, reason, calculate and choose. Perception of others as in most 
ways like oneself in needs and potentials also provides the basis for perceptions 
of unfairness in terms of actual situation and opportunities. 
Preparation of scenarios can further be helpful in facilitating cooperation, 
if used to bring together diverse stakeholders for two- and multi-way learning. 
Storylines about the future may be more vivid, stimulating and fruitful objects 
for debate than are generalised models or theories; and a particular scenario 
can become accepted as relevant by several different groups each for different 
reasons. The processes of discussion can, potentially, increase trust between 
diverse participants, increase creativity, and promote commitment for 
cooperation to achieve a superior scenario. 
The human security approach and its partner languages 
Each of the ‘languages’, the formulations and discourses we have looked at, 
can have its own zone or zones of usefulness, each suiting different purposes 
and audiences; so that they are partly complementary, not merely competitive. 
The degree of impact of the Stern Review in some rich-government circles 
depends partly on its hundreds of pages of marshalled data and standard 
economic argumentation. We saw however that utilitarian-type monetization 
and aggregation in order to make basic policy choices is a very different and 
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less acceptable matter, compared to the use of markets to help implement 
policy goals set by non-market considerations. And further, cooperation 
around global public goods cannot be conducted satisfactorily only in 
‘economic man’ terms, guided by clever manipulation of carrots and sticks. 
Standard economics can function as sorcerer’s apprentice more than as 
handmaiden. There are limitations and contradictions of seeking to respond to 
climate change solely by using adapted versions of forms of thinking that have 
fuelled it: calculated pursuit of self-interest; well-being seen as ‘utility’ gained 
through acquisition and consumption of commodities; and Nature seen as a 
cornutopia, sink and recycler, a bountiful mother that provides without limit 
and always tidies up afterwards. Shifts of thinking in these three areas are 
required, as summed up in The Earth Charter and elsewhere: a conception of 
and commitment to a ‘we’, over time and space, for otherwise free-riding and 
seizing of selfish advantage whenever possible are likely to undermine schemes 
for administering public goods; a rethinking of well-being, as grounded in 
relationships and self-control more than in things and self-indulgence; and a 
different vision of and feeling of responsibility to Nature (Kates et al., 2006). A 
Stern Review does not suffice, as seems confirmed by subsequent trends, 
including the failure to move forward at the Copenhagen climate conference. 
Human security thinking takes insights from public economics and public 
health and adds greatly to them. It brings holistic attention, through an implicit 
or explicit storytelling style, to the interactions between different sectors of life, 
and avoids the self-blinding restriction to analysis within single sectors or to 
only numerical models of inter-sectoral relations. This increases its advantages 
over the types of calculation conducted by economists such as Stiglitz and 
Stern. 
In comparison too to the approaches of human rights and human 
development, certainly in their pre-existing versions, human security thinking 
has advantages for making progress on the Earth Charter’s agenda. It grounds 
those approaches better in the nature of being and wellbeing, through 
focussing on ordinary people’s daily lives and the contingencies and 
consequent sequences of disadvantage that can arise. The stresses on basic 
requirements, shared fragility and felt experience strengthen ‘joined-up feeling’, 
the foundation for solidarity. In contrast, the human development approach’s 
language of increased options for attainment by individuals is open to neo-
liberal and consumerist uses. Human rights thinking too can be overly 
individualistic. Human security thinking adds emphases on the human species 
as a whole, our interdependence and the potential ramifying chains of threats, 
including through triggering of threshold effects, and on the subjective felt 
meanings that contribute to extend such chains when particular threats arise to 
what are understood as basic human rights. It gives us a more adequate basis 
for considering cross-sector interactions and dangers, and for responding to 
them. It may be a particularly helpful legacy from development ethics for the 
discussion of climate change. 
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